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Abstract
This paper examines Wall Street Journal news stories about 79 firms that forced 
CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force CEO turnover. 
In the two years prior to turnover, firms in the forced-turnover sample were the 
subjects of 76% more news stories about poor firm performance despite being 
from the same industry, of similar size, and similar performance as a sample of 
matched firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that scrutiny of poor firm perfor-
mance by the financial press increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.
Keywords: CEO turnover, corporate governance, earnings announcements
1. Introduction
We examine the coverage of firm events by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) to de-
termine whether WSJ coverage influences the board’s decision to remove a CEO. 
Specifically, we examine whether WSJ coverage of firm performance influences 
the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. The WSJ commonly reports on the earn-
ings of firms in its “Digest of Corporate Earnings Reports” section. Less com-
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monly, the WSJ comments on a company’s earnings report by pointing out earn-
ings increases or decreases and discussing the reasons for the increase or decrease 
in a separate news article. The focus of this paper is on whether this latter form of 
monitoring by the WSJ is related to the incidence of CEO turnover.1
There are several reasons why WSJ coverage of a firm’s poor performance 
might be associated with an increased likelihood of CEO turnover. First, Low-
enstein (1996, 1999) argues that the media influences corporate boards to be 
more effective because it creates fear that shareholders will sell their shares in 
response to negative press coverage. He cites several examples of media cover-
age putting pressure on corporate boards to make changes in their firm’s oper-
ations or management. Second, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue 
that outside directors have an incentive to be effective monitors of senior man-
agers to signal to shareholders and labor markets their value as experts in deci-
sion control. Negative media coverage of firm performance may affect director 
reputations and create an incentive for directors to remove the CEO in an ef-
fort to salvage their reputations. Third, Sutton and Galunic (1996) suggest that 
scrutiny of business leaders can lead to constant distraction that interferes with 
their thought and action. Scrutiny, therefore, can reduce the business leader’s 
ability to be an effective leader.2 Such business leaders may be more likely to re-
sign or be forced to resign.
Using a sample of 79 firms that forced CEO turnovers between 1982 and 1997 
and a matched sample of firms in the same industry, of similar size, and sim-
ilar performance that do not forcibly remove their CEO, we examine the fre-
quency of various news events, including performance changes, in the WSJ In-
dex in the two years prior to turnover and the two years after turnover. We also 
examine whether the decisions made by fired CEOs differ significantly from de-
cisions made by matched-sample CEOs. Khanna and Poulsen (1995) find that the 
decisions made by firms that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy are not significantly 
different from the decisions made by a matched sample of firms that do not file 
Chapter 11. Their results suggest that the poor performance of the Chapter 11 
firms is not due to poor decision making by the CEOs. We examine whether the 
decisions made by fired CEOs differ from the decisions made by matched-sample 
CEOs. If the fired CEOs did make bad decisions relative to the matched-sample 
CEOs, then we expect to find that the nature and type of decisions made by the 
fired CEOs influences the likelihood of CEO turnover. In addition, the share price 
response to these decisions should be negative when compared to the share price 
response to decisions announced by surviving CEOs.
The results suggest that CEOs in the forced-turnover sample make decisions 
that are similar to the matched-sample firm CEOs. Prior to turnover, there are 
1 The WSJ may tend to over-report on some firms and under-report on others. We attempt to 
control for any biases in the WSJ’s reporting by using a matched-sample methodology and 
controlling for other factors that might influence the WSJ’s reporting on a firm.
2 Sutton and Galunic (1996) suggest five consequences of scrutiny including, for example, fre-
quent delays in ongoing tasks; attention and effort devoted toward symbolic activities; and 
attention and effort diverted away from learning and creativity.
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no meaningful differences in the number of acquisition, expansions, new debt, 
loan extensions, stock issues, and stock buybacks announced by the two samples. 
The only significant difference in manager decisions, as reported in the WSJ, is 
that firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 62% more news sto-
ries about asset sales, layoffs, and downsizing than the matched sample. After 
controlling for other factors associated with CEO turnover, however, the num-
ber of these types of decisions is not significant in explaining CEO turnover. Fur-
ther, the market responses to the various decisions are not significantly different 
across the two samples. These results suggest that while both samples are per-
forming poorly, managers in the forced-turnover sample were making more po-
tentially unpopular decisions than managers in the matched sample. However, 
these decisions do not appear to increase the likelihood of CEO turnover.
Our analysis of WSJ reporting on firm performance finds significant differ-
ences in the number of news stories about declining earnings during the two 
years prior to turnover. The forced-turnover sample firms were the subjects of 
76% more declining earnings stories than the matched-sample firms. Even after 
controlling for several measures of firm performance and other factors associated 
with CEO turnover, we find a statistically significant relation between WSJ re-
porting on poor firm performance and the likelihood of CEO turnover. Our re-
sults suggest that increased scrutiny of firm performance by the financial press 
puts pressure on the board to remove the CEO. This is consistent with the finan-
cial press offsetting some of the free rider problems associated with diffuse share 
ownership in publicly traded corporations by holding managers publicly ac-
countable for poor firm performance.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the reasons why 
financial press scrutiny may increase the likelihood of CEO turnover. Section 3 
describes the sample. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper.
2. Scrutiny by the financial press and CEO turnover
The literature on the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance 
indicates that poor firm performance by itself does not necessarily lead to CEO 
turnover. Weisbach (1988) finds that CEO turnover following poor firm perfor-
mance is most likely to occur in firms that have a board of directors that is domi-
nated by outsiders. Others provide evidence that the pressure to replace a poorly 
performing CEO can also come from takeover markets (Martin and McConnell, 
1991), institutional investors (Parrino et al., 2000) and outside blockholders (De-
nis and Serrano, 1996). In this section, we discuss the reasons why financial press 
scrutiny can also influence the board’s decision to remove a CEO from office.
There is substantial evidence that media attention affects how others view 
individuals and organizations. One way media attention affects perceptions is 
by deciding on what issues, events, people, and organizations are newswor-
thy, thereby focusing attention on some issues and distracting attention away 
from other subjects (Price and Tewksbury, 1997). For example, Pan and Kosicki 
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(1997) find evidence that those issues receiving the most media coverage estab-
lish the basis by which most citizens judge the performance of political lead-
ers. Media attention also affects perceptions by the manner in which the issue 
or event is presented (Gamson, 1992). Price et al. (1997) show that readers’ re-
sponse to a news story is a function of the manner in which the issue or event is 
presented.
In addition, there is substantial evidence that media attention, or the threat of 
media attention, affects the behavior of individuals and organizations. For ex-
ample, Flynn (2000) reports that media attention prolongs the duration of labor 
strikes by increasing the feelings of personal responsibility and accountability for 
the parties involved. Hence, the parties to a strike assume more rigid positions 
when their positions are made public. In another context, Cavender and Mulcahy 
(1998) discuss how the threat of media coverage and the need to maintain a posi-
tive corporate image can deter corporations from engaging in corporate crime. In 
addition, the broader WSJ coverage of poorly performing firms may exacerbate 
operating problems at these firms by harming relations with suppliers, custom-
ers, lenders, etc. For example, negative financial press may cause customers to be 
wary of a product if reliable after-sales-service is important. Similarly, the nega-
tive financial press may cause suppliers and/or lenders to tighten credit policies 
at a time when a firm can least afford it.
Lowenstein (1996, 1999) argues that the financial press, along with financial 
analysts and other commentators, has forced corporate boards to become more 
active and independent. According to his arguments, the financial transparency 
created by mandatory disclosure requirements enhances corporate governance 
in the United States by providing the financial press with the information neces-
sary to meaningfully comment on firm performance. Lowenstein (1999) argues 
that “the potential for adverse publicity compensates for the damage inflicted un-
der the so-called free rider doctrine, which says that if there are too many share-
holders then none of them will bother to become active.” According to these ar-
guments, increased scrutiny of firms by the financial press, analysts, and others 
pressures boards to be more effective because of the fear that bad publicity will 
cause a decline in firm value.
In addition, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside di-
rectors have an incentive to serve as effective monitors of senior managers to 
signal shareholders and labor markets their value as experts in decision con-
trol. Empirical evidence confirms that outside directors, in some circumstances, 
perform an important monitoring function (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Brickley and 
James, 1987; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994). Further, Farrell and 
Whidbee (2000) find evidence that outside directors are rewarded with addi-
tional outside directorships when they remove a poorly performing CEO and 
replace him or her with a CEO that improves firm performance. Directors may 
perceive that their reputations are adversely affected if the firm is the subject 
of a significant number of unfavorable WSJ news items. Directors of firms that 
receive unfavorable coverage of firm performance might remove the CEO in 
an effort to improve firm performance and avoid continued bad publicity and 
damage to their reputations.
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Finally, one of the CEO’s responsibilities is to influence the investing public’s 
perception of the firm by fostering a positive corporate image. Unfavorable cov-
erage of the firm’s performance detracts from this image and may reflect poorly 
on the CEO’s abilities. A CEO that does a poor job of influencing media coverage 
may face an increased likelihood of being fired. If we consider the WSJ’s coverage 
of poor firm performance an indicator of the CEO’s ability to influence the media, 
then we can expect a greater incidence of CEO turnover in those firms that are the 
subjects of more WSJ news items about poor firm performance.
In sum, the reporting by the WSJ on poor firm performance may influence 
the board of director’s decision of whether or not to remove a poorly perform-
ing CEO. Extant literature suggests that forced CEO turnover can result from ex-
ternal pressures, such as takeover markets, institutional investors, and outside 
blockholders. In addition, the financial press, especially the WSJ, may influence 
the board of directors to force CEO turnover by drawing attention to a firm’s poor 
performance.
3. Sample design
We identify CEO turnovers using the Forbes Annual Survey of Compensation for 
the 1981–1993 period and the Execucomp database for the 1994–1997 period.3 Af-
ter excluding regulated firms, CEOs that were in office for less than two years, and 
turnovers that were not announced in the WSJ, we identified 148 forced CEO turn-
overs.4 A turnover is classified as forced if the WSJ article discussing the departure 
mentions pressure from the board of directors, resignation, scandal, reorganization, 
demotion, policy or personality disagreement, or poor performance.5 From the 148 
forced turnovers, we lose 69 additional turnovers due to an inability to find an ap-
propriate matching firm, missing proxy statements, or missing Compustat data. 
The final sample consists of 79 forced CEO turnovers associated with 76 firms.
3.1. Matched sample
To test for whether reporting on poor firm performance by the financial press 
increases the likelihood of CEO turnover, we select a matched sample of firms 
that do not force CEO turnover. To form the matched sample, we search for com-
panies that satisfy the following criteria:
3 Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) note that sample selections based on the Forbes 500 may bias 
a sample toward large, surviving, and growing firms. When possible, we include firms that 
drop out of the Forbes sample before the end of the 1993 period, as well as firms that appear 
in Forbes at any time during the sample period.
4 We place these restrictions on the sample because of the significant differences between reg-
ulated firms and unregulated firms as documented by Baysinger and Zardkoohi (1986) and 
Subrahmanyam et al. (1997). The two-year restriction is intended to eliminate turnovers of 
interim CEOs.
5 We use criteria similar to Blackwell and Farrell (1999) in defining forced departure who com-
bine the criteria used by Weisbach (1988), Gilson (1989) and Parrino (1997).
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1. The matching firm operates in the same two-digit standard industrial classifi-
cation (SIC) code as the forced-turnover firm.6
2. The matching firm is included in the Forbes Annual Survey of Compensation for 
the 1981–1993 period or the Execucomp database for the 1994–1997 period.
3. The matching firm’s total assets are between 50% and 150% of the forced-turn-
over firm’s total assets.
4. The matching firm’s performance is similar to the forced-turnover firm’s per-
formance, as measured by annual stock returns.7
5. The matching firm does not experience a forced-turnover for five years sur-
rounding the turnover date of the forced-turnover firm.
We use an industry- and size-matched sample to mitigate the influence of in-
dustry and size on CEO turnover and the types of decisions made and announced 
in the WSJ. Thompson et al. (1987) find that larger firms receive greater coverage 
in the WSJ than smaller firms. Parrino (1997) finds evidence that the availabil-
ity of a strong outside candidate, frequently those with experience in the same 
or similar industry, is an important consideration in the decision by the board to 
replace a poor CEO. Using an industry-matched sample helps to control for the 
availability of a strong outside candidate as a factor that may influence the likeli-
hood of turnover.
In addition, the sample is matched on performance because previous research 
documents a negative relation between forced-turnover and firm performance (e.g., 
Gilson, 1989; Weisbach, 1988; Parrino, 1997). Since we are interested in the factors 
that influence the likelihood that a CEO will be fired, the matched sample includes 
only firms that did not fire their CEO during the five fiscal years surrounding the 
turnover date of the forced-turnover sample firm. The matched sample includes 
firms that experience either no turnover or only voluntary turnovers.
3.2. Comparison of the forced-turnover and matched firms
The median characteristics of the turnover and the matched-sample firms are 
shown in Table 1.8 Firms in the turnover sample are, on average, slightly larger 
6 We use two-digit SIC codes as the sample of possible matches using three- or four-digit SIC 
codes is too small when combined with our other matching criteria. In addition, Clark (1989) 
finds that SIC codes are more effective at dividing firms into broad industrial groups than 
at dividing firms into three- and four-digit segments to more closely represent economic 
markets.
7 After identifying all potential matched-sample firms using two-digit SIC codes and asset size, 
the average annual stock return during the two years prior to turnover for the forced-turn-
over sample firm was compared to the average annual stock return over the same period 
for each of the potential matched-sample firms. The potential matched-sample firms were 
then ranked based on the absolute value of the difference in their performance and the turn-
over firm’s performance, with those firms having the smallest difference being ranked first. 
We then selected the highest ranked firm that does not experience a forced-turnover for five 
years surrounding the turnover date of the forced-turnover firm.
8 Table 1 reports medians, but means are available from the authors. The results of paired dif-
ference tests are very similar regardless of whether we use the parametric t-statistic or the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic.
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Table 1. Medians for 79 firms with forced CEO turnover and 79 matching firms without forced 
CEO turnover
Variable                                                                   Medians for        Medians for       Wilcoxon
                                                                          firms that forced    firms that did     signed-rank
                                                                             CEO turnover    not force CEO     statistica
                                                                                                                                 turnover
Pre-turnover financial characteristics b
Sales (in billions)  $1.955  $1.880  366.0*
Market value of equity (in billions)  $1.331  $1.144  327.0*
Performance during two years prior to turnover
Industry-adjusted ROAA c  1.14%  1.63%  –173.0
Change in industry-adjusted ROAA c  0.84%  0.46%  315.5
Number of quarters with a decline in earningsd 4.00  4.00  30.0
Number of quarters with a large decline in earningsd 2.00  1.00  
503.0***
Average quarterly earnings surprisee  –20.78%  –13.27%  –77.5
Average annual market-adjusted stock returnsf –10.43%  –9.38%  –308.0
Pre-turnover ownership structure
Share ownership by officers of the firm 0.86%  1.26%  –373.0*
Share ownership by affiliated outside directors 0.07%  0.08%  –146.0
Share ownership by independent outside directors 0.06%  0.07%  –125.0
Share ownership by institutional investors  51.84%  50.99%  42.0
Pre-turnover corporate governance
Officer board membership  25.00%  25.00%  128.0
Affiliated outside board membership  22.22%  21.43%  –73.5
Independent outside board membership 50.00%  50.00%  62.5
Board size  12.00  12.00  –12.5
Pre-turnover analyst following g
Number of analysts one year prior to turnover 10.50  10.00  179.5
Number of analysts at month of turnover  12.00  10.00  200.5
Performance during two years after turnover
Industry-adjusted ROAA after turnover (two years)h 1.36%  0.87%  162.0
Average annual market-adjusted stock returnsf –2.08%  –0.88%  254.5
a The Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic tests the null hypothesis that the two samples have the same 
median. The statistics are based on paired differences between the two samples. Tests based on 
t-statistics yield very similar results.
b Sales and market value of equity are measured as of the end of the fiscal year preceding turnover 
and expressed in constant 1990 dollars.
(continued on next page)
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than matched-sample firms as measured by sales and market value of equity. 
To determine the sensitivity of our matching criteria to the choice of firm perfor-
mance measure, we calculate several alternative performance measures for the 
two years prior to CEO turnover, including: industry-adjusted return on average 
assets (ROAA) 9; the change in industry adjusted ROAA; the number of quarters 
the firm experiences a decline in earnings; the number of quarters the firm experi-
ences a large decline in earnings 10; the average quarterly earnings surprise 11; and 
market-adjusted stock returns. We find that the forced-turnover and matched-
sample firms perform similarly prior to the turnover date for all of the perfor-
mance measures except the number of quarters in which the firm experiences a 
large decline in earnings.
We also compare the ownership structure and corporate governance charac-
teristics of the turnover and matched samples. These characteristics are based on 
Table 1 (continued)
c Pre-turnover return on average assets (ROAA) is measured during the last two years ending prior 
to CEO turnover. It is industry adjusted by differencing from industry medians using two-digit SIC 
codes. Changes in ROAA are based on changes in the industry-adjusted performance measures 
during the two years prior to CEO turnover. We were able to calculate these changes for only 
73 of the firms in the forced-turnover sample and 72 of the firms in the matched sample due to 
insufficient data. Calculating the changes requires three years of pre-turnover data, which was not 
available for some of the firms.
d The number of quarters with a decline in earnings is measured during the eight quarters that 
end prior to CEO turnover. The number of quarters with a large decline in earnings is based on 
whether the decline in earnings represented more than a 50% decline relative to the previous 
quarter or, in cases where the previous quarter showed a loss, if losses increased by more than 
100%.
e Earnings surprise data are the percentage difference between actual quarterly earnings and 
forecasted earnings. Forecasted earnings are from Zachs Investment Research. Quarterly earnings 
forecasts were available for only 42 of the forced-turnover firms and 43 of the matched firms. The 
signed-rank statistic is based on 38 matched pairs.
f Stock returns are market-adjusted using the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted index.
g Analyst following data are from Zachs Investment Research and reflect the number of analysts in a 
given month making earnings predictions for the fiscal year. Analyst following data were available 
for only 66 forced-turnover firms and 66 matched firms. The signed-rank statistic is based on 65 
matched pairs.
h Post-turnover ROAA is measured during the two years that begin after CEO turnover.
*   Difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.
**  Difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
***  Difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
9 ROAA data are industry adjusted by differencing them from industry medians based on two-
digit SIC codes.
10 The number of quarters with a large decline in earnings is based on whether the decline in 
earnings was more than a 50% decline relative to the previous quarter or, in cases where the 
previous quarter showed a loss, if losses increased by more than 100%.
11 Earnings surprise data are the percentage difference between actual quarterly earnings and 
forecasted earnings. Forecasted earnings are from Zachs Investment Research.
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information contained in the proxy statement filed just prior to turnover. Previ-
ous studies find that ownership by officers and directors’ influences the perfor-
mance-turnover relation. Denis et al. (1997) find that even after controlling for 
performance, the probability of top executive turnover is negatively related to 
the ownership stake of officers and directors. After controlling for firm perfor-
mance, Denis and Denis (1994) find that majority-owned firms experience signifi-
cantly lower rates of top management turnover than a control sample of diffusely 
held firms. Mikkelson and Partch (1997) also document a negative relation be-
tween top executive turnover and the equity ownership of officers and directors. 
As shown in Table 1, officers in the matched sample own slightly more firm eq-
uity than in the forced-turnover sample.
Parrino et al. (2000) find evidence that institutional investors tend to sell shares 
in firms that subsequently force CEO turnover, suggesting that institutional sell-
ing pressures the board to remove a poorly performing CEO. We find no signifi-
cant difference between the institutional ownership of the turnover and matched 
firms in our sample. Similarly, there are no significant differences in the number 
of analysts following the firms.
Weisbach (1988) finds a stronger relation exists between turnover and poor 
performance, as measured by earnings or stock returns, when the board is dom-
inated by outside directors. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find evidence that 
board composition is related to the CEO succession process. Again, Table 1 il-
lustrates that both the matched sample and forced-turnover sample have similar 
board composition with approximately 25% of the members representing man-
agement, 22% representing affiliated outsiders and 50% representing indepen-
dent outsiders.12
Overall, Table 1 indicates that, despite our matching criteria, the forced-turn-
over firms are slightly larger, have lower inside ownership, and experienced 
more large declines in earnings during the two years prior to turnover than the 
matched-sample firms. We control for these differences and other potential deter-
minants of CEO turnover in the empirical analysis that follows.
4. Empirical analysis
We collect media coverage information for the two groups of firms by examin-
ing the WSJ Index for announcements and news reports about manager decisions, 
legal actions against the firm, proxy contests, and positive or negative earnings 
announcements. Similar to Khanna and Poulsen (1995), we identify the following 
manager decisions: changes in top management (which includes chairmen, pres-
idents, chief financial officers and chief operating officers); plant closings, layoffs, 
asset sales or downsizing; acquisitions and expansions; lending arrangements 
and new debt; debt swaps; issuance of equity; and stock buybacks.
12 We define affiliated outside directors as any director with a specified business relation with 
the firm, retirees, or family members and independent outside directors as having no affili-
ation with the firm. Our definition is consistent with Weisbach (1988) and Farrell and Whid-
bee (2000), among others.
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One potential concern in this analysis is that WSJ reporting of manager de-
cisions may be biased such that some managers’ decisions are underreported 
while other managers receive extensive coverage. However, Yau et al. (1994) find 
that WSJ-based samples for corporate news items are representative of cases not 
covered by the WSJ. In addition, we attempt to control for any biases in WSJ re-
porting of manager decisions using the matched-sample methodology described 
above.
In addition to the manager decisions announced in the WSJ, we collect data 
on several non-decision news articles about the firm. The non-decision articles 
we are most interested in are WSJ news items that comment on a firm’s earnings 
announcements as a measure of the degree of coverage of a firm’s performance. 
Specifically, we searched the WSJ Index for earnings announcements that are ac-
companied by commentary indicating whether the announced earnings represent 
an increase or decrease. Earnings announcements that did not explicitly indicate 
whether the reported earnings represented an increase or decrease were ignored 
because they do not represent significant monitoring by the WSJ. Earnings an-
nouncements accompanied by commentary, however, are indicative of monitor-
ing activity by the WSJ.
Other non-decision articles include announcements of the firm being the tar-
get of legal action as a potential indicator of illegal or unethical behavior by 
senior management and proxy contests as a potential indicator of shareholder 
dissent. We did not collect information about some common types of announce-
ments. For example, we did not include articles about changes in sales reve-
nue unless the change in revenue was also associated with a change in earnings. 
Also ignored were subsequent news items about a previously announced event. 
For example, only the first announcement about an acquisition is included in 
this analysis. Subsequent announcements (e.g., announcements about the ac-
quisition being completed) are ignored because we only expect the market to 
respond to new information and we wanted to avoid double-counting of some 
events.
In an effort to determine whether the market’s perception of the quality of 
management decisions differs between the forced-turnover sample and the 
matched sample, we estimate the share price response to the decisions an-
nounced by the two groups of CEOs. In addition, we estimate the share price 
response to the non-decision announcements in the WSJ. Single-index mar-
ket model parameters are estimated over the 170 to 20 days preceding each an-
nouncement. From these parameters, we determine abnormal stock returns 
around the event announcement, reporting the announcement effect as the av-
erage cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from the day before the event to the 
day of the announcement. See Brown and Warner (1985) for a more complete 
description of the methodology.
4.1. Summary of news announcements surrounding forced CEO turnover
Table 2 summarizes the news articles that were published in the WSJ in the 
four years surrounding forced-turnover for the forced-turnover sample and for 
the comparable sample period for the matched-sample firms. All of the forced-
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turnover firms and all but one of the matched-sample firms were the subject of 
at least one WSJ article during the four years surrounding turnover. The turn-
over firms had a total of 1251 news articles, which is substantially more than the 
matched-sample firms, which had only 912 news articles.
Table 2. Summary of news announcements for 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and 79 matching 
firms that did not force CEO turnovera
Type of announcement         Firms that forced CEO turnover      Matching firms that did not force
                                                                                                CEO turnover
 Number  Number  Maximum  Number  Number  Maximum
 of firms  of events  number  of firms  of events  number
   of events    of events
    for a firm    for a firm
Change in top management (1) 79  121  5  36  51  3
Asset sales, layoffs, downsizing (2) 68 320 27 52 198 21
Acquisitions or expansions (3) 57 207 15 61 202 15
New debt or loan extensions (4) 28 50 5 17 34 6
Issue stock (5)  14 20 3 14 19 4
Stock buyback (6) 27 38 4 33 42 3
Other decisionsb (7) 23 31 3 25 40 5
All decisions (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 76 666 30 74 535 36
All “bad” decisions (2, 5) 69 340 27 55 217 22
All “good” decisions (3, 4, 6) 67 295 16 69 278 16
All negative CAR decisionsc 68 318 17 64 256  12
All positive CAR decisionsc 69  341 18 68 273 25
Target of legal action  37 83 8 29 51 5
Earnings increases 57 201 11 46 156 11
Earnings decreases 60 171 10 46 111 9
Proxy contests 4 5 2 2 3 2
All announcements 79 1251 47 78 912 54
a This table summarizes the frequency of various news announcements in the Wall Street Journal 
Index for a sample of 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and 79 matching firms that did not force 
CEO turnover. The number of firms is the number of firms (out of a possible 79) with at least one 
announcement of the given type. The number of events is the total number of announcements 
of a given type for either the 79 firms that forced CEO turnover or the 79 matching firms 
that did not force CEO turnover. The announcements were made in the four years surrounding 
turnover.
b Other decisions include debt-for-equity swaps, debt redemptions, and the adoption of anti-
takeover charter amendments.
c Positive CAR decisions are those decisions with a cumulative abnormal return over the (–1, 0) 
event period greater than zero. Negative CAR decisions are those decisions with a cumulative 
abnormal return over the (–1, 0) event period less than zero.
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We also develop categories for decisions based on empirical regularities 
noted in previous studies. We define a category for “bad” decisions as those 
relating to plant closings, layoffs, asset sales or downsizing, or the issuance of 
equity. These events are often associated with bad news about a company’s 
performance or growth opportunities and/or are typically associated with a 
negative market reaction upon their announcement.13 Similarly, we define a 
category of decisions relating to acquisitions and expansions; lending arrange-
ments and new debt; and stock buybacks as “good” decisions. These events are 
often associated with good news about the company’s performance or growth 
opportunities and/or are typically associated with a positive market reaction 
upon announcement.14 We do not classify top management changes as “good” 
or “bad” because the reaction to these announcements is a function of the level 
of top management, firm performance, and whether the turnover is forced or 
voluntary. Also we exclude other decisions since these announcements include 
events that are difficult to categorize. For the forced-turnover sample, slightly 
more than half of the decision announcements are categorized as “bad” while 
the majority of decision announcements made by the matched sample are cate-
gorized as “good.”
Our definitions for “good” and “bad” decisions are somewhat arbitrary and 
subject to debate. To consider the sensitivity of our results to the definitions of 
“good” and “bad” decisions, we also partition decisions by the cumulative ab-
normal return associated with each individual decision announcement. In other 
words, all decision announcements that result in a negative CAR and all decision 
announcements that result in a positive CAR are placed into separate categories. 
Based on these classifications, slightly more than half of the decisions announced 
by both samples resulted in a positive CAR.
The forced-turnover sample firms were the subjects of many more non-deci-
sion announcements (target of legal action, earnings increases, earnings decreases, 
and proxy contests) than the matched-sample firms. Specifically, the forced-turn-
over firms were the subjects of 171 news items about declining earnings while the 
matched firms were the subjects of only 111 such news items. Coincidentally, the 
forced-turnover firms were also the subjects of more news items about increasing 
earnings (201 versus 156).
In the following section, we examine the share price response to manager de-
cisions and non-decision announcements in an effort to determine the quality of 
manager decisions as perceived by the market and to assess the market’s reaction 
to the non-decision announcements.
13 For example, Blackwell et al. (1990) find a negative stock market reaction to plant closing an-
nouncements. Asquith and Mullins (1986) find a negative stock market reaction to the an-
nouncement of seasoned equity issues.
14 For example, James (1987) finds a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of new 
bank credit agreements and a statistically insignificant reaction to the issuance of private 
placements of debt or public straight debt. We argue that acquisitions and expansions are 
indications of growth opportunities available to the firm.
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4.2. Market reaction to news announcements prior to forced CEO turnover
The first two columns of Table 3 summarize the market response to the vari-
ous announcements that took place two years prior to turnover. In general, the 
market response to individual decision announcements for the forced-turnover 
sample firms tends not to differ significantly from zero two years prior to turn-
over. Our results are consistent with several studies that document different 
market responses to the same types of announcements. For example, Palmon 
et al. (1997) find that the market response to layoff announcements depends on 
whether the layoff is a cost cutting measure or a response to product market 
conditions. Similarly, Akhigbe et al. (1997) find that the market response to cor-
porate debt issues depends on whether the issue is the result of a cash flow 
shortfall or an increase in firm investments, an increase in firm leverage, or a re-
financing of firm debt. James (1987) finds that new debt announcements have 
varying market responses depending on whether it is bank debt or a straight 
debt issue.
The only significant reaction to individual news announcements for the 
forced-turnover sample firms were negative reactions to earning decreases and 
announcements that these firms are the targets of legal action.15 The matched-
sample firms experience similar negative and statistically significant reactions 
to these announcements. The matched-sample firms also experience a statis-
tically significant positive reaction to the small number of stock buybacks an-
nounced in the WSJ. The CAR associated with changes in top management is 
negative and statistically significant for the matched sample, but not signif-
icant for the forced-turnover sample.16 Overall, both the forced-turnover and 
matched-sample firms experience CARs that are negative, on average, for all 
announcements.
None of the differences between the forced-turnover and matched-sample 
firms are statistically significant.17 This is important because it suggests that nei-
ther the reasons nor the motivations for the decisions are systematically differ-
ent for the two groups of firms and that the market does not perceive the forced-
turnover sample firms to be making significantly different decisions than the 
matched-sample firms prior to turnover.
4.3. Market reaction to news announcements after forced CEO turnover
In the two years following turnover, the matched-sample firms and the forced-
turnover sample firms experience similar market reactions to most individual 
news announcements and the various news announcement categories. This is 
shown in the last two columns of Table 3. Reactions to individual news announce-
15 The negative CARs associated with announcements of legal action against the firm are con-
sistent with findings by Karpoff and Lott (1993).
16 Note that we excluded the 79 announcements relating to the forced CEO turnovers in the 
forced-turnover sample firms.
17 The t-statistics associated with the tests for differences in CARs between the turnover and 
matched samples are not shown in Table 3 but are available from the authors.
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ments are also similar between samples, with both samples exhibiting signifi-
cantly positive CARs for positive earnings announcements and stock buybacks. 
Earnings decreases and being the target of legal action, on the other hand, are as-
sociated with negative CARs for both the turnover and matched-sample firms. 
The only differences in response to news announcements across samples are sig-
nificantly positive CARs for acquisitions and expansions, and new debt or loan 
extensions for the forced-turnover sample firms and insignificant CARs for the 
matched-sample firms. However, as in the pre-turnover announcements, none of 
these differences are statistically significant.
Contrary to our expectations, the results indicate little evidence of differences 
between the CARs associated with WSJ stories about the forced-turnover sample 
firms and the CARs associated with matched-sample firms before or after turn-
over. The market response to the decisions announced by the forced-turnover 
sample firms is not viewed as being value decreasing relative to the decisions an-
nounced by matched-sample firms. In other words, it does not appear that CEOs 
in the forced-turnover sample make decisions that are considered unexpectedly 
poor by the market prior to being forced from office.
4.4. Analysis of news announcements surrounding forced CEO turnover
Given that the market response to announcements by the forced-turnover and 
matched-sample firms do not significantly differ prior to forced turnover, we fur-
ther analyze the type and frequency of news announcements for each sample. 
The greater number of announcements by the forced-turnover sample, as shown 
in Table 2, suggests that either the forced-turnover sample had a greater number 
of news events or the WSJ published a greater percentage of the turnover-sample 
news events. In an effort to test whether differences in the number of news sto-
ries are statistically significant, we perform paired difference tests on the average 
number of the various types of announcements. The results of this analysis are 
shown in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 reveals differences in the number of WSJ announcements of manager 
decisions. Prior to turnover, forced-turnover firms are the subjects of a greater 
number of news stories about manager decisions than the matched firms al-
though the difference is not statistically significant. However, the forced-turn-
over sample firms are the subjects of a significantly greater number of WSJ sto-
ries about “bad” decisions before turnover relative to the matched-sample firms. 
The significantly greater number of “bad” decision announcements can be attrib-
uted, in a large part, to the significantly greater number of news stories associ-
ated with asset sales, layoffs, and downsizing. As a result of these decisions, the 
median annual growth in assets, sales, and number of employees during the two 
years that precede the year of turnover are 4.2%, 1.3%, and −0.3%, respectively, 
for the forced-turnover firms. These growth figures are much smaller than the 
growth experienced by the matched sample, which had median annual growth in 
assets, sales, and number of employees during the same two years of 8.4%, 6.4%, 
and 1.1%, respectively.
Following turnover, forced-turnover sample firms continue to be the subjects 
of a greater number of WSJ articles about “bad” decisions than the matched sam-
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ple. However, while the forced-turnover sample firms continue to be the subjects 
of a significantly greater number of news stories about asset sales, layoffs, and 
downsizing, they are also the subjects of a greater number of news stories that 
generate positive CARs.18
Table 5 reports differences in the number of non-decision announcements in 
the WSJ. Prior to turnover, the forced-turnover sample firms are the subjects of 
a significantly greater number of WSJ announcements of being the target of le-
gal action, earnings decreases, and proxy contests. The greater number of earn-
ings decrease announcements is of particular interest because of the similar per-
formance of the turnover and matched-sample firms. All else equal, we would 
expect to observe a similar number of earnings decrease announcements for the 
two groups of firms. The greater number of these announcements for the forced-
turnover sample suggests that the performance of the forced-turnover sample 
was more closely monitored by the WSJ.
The greater number of WSJ announcements about the forced-turnover firms 
being the target of legal action may suggest that managers of these firms be-
have unethically and may be one reason for the increased scrutiny by the finan-
cial press. However, according to the results of a recent study by Agrawal et al. 
(1999), it is unlikely that the legal action explains the incidence of forced CEO 
turnover in these firms. They find little evidence that the managers of firms that 
are charged with fraud have an increased likelihood of losing their jobs.19
The greater number of WSJ stories about proxy contests in the forced-turnover 
sample suggests that the managers of these firms may have been under greater 
pressure to resign than their matched sample counterparts for reasons other 
than WSJ coverage. The results of the analysis that follows are qualitatively un-
changed, however, when these firms are excluded from the analysis.
Following turnover, forced-turnover firms are the subjects of a signifi-
cantly greater number of news stories regarding earnings increases. Differ-
ences in the number of stories about earnings decreases are not significant af-
ter turnover. Overall, these results suggest that while the WSJ continues to give 
greater scrutiny to the forced-turnover firms after turnover, the reporting ap-
pears to be more favorable. Further, the results suggest that although matched-
sample firms were in the same industry, of similar size, and performing simi-
larly, forced-turnover sample firms were under greater scrutiny by the financial 
press.
18 Khanna and Poulsen (1995) find that the Chapter 11 firms that experience turnover announce 
more downsizing decisions. Weisbach (1995) investigates the incidence of divestitures fol-
lowing CEO turnover and, finds evidence of an increased likelihood of divestitures follow-
ing CEO turnover. The results of this study are consistent with Weisbach and Khanna and 
Poulsen, but also show an increased incidence of asset sales, layoffs, and downsizing prior 
to turnover.
19 More detailed analysis of the legal actions indicates that the differences between the turnover 
and matched firms are not due to increased allegations of fraud or misconduct among the 
forced-turnover firms. Prior to turnover, both the turnover firms and the matched firms are 
the subjects of seven news items concerning allegations of fraud.
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4.5. Logit analysis of CEO turnover
A potential limitation of the pair-wise analysis reported in Tables 4 and 5 is the 
inability to control for other factors beyond the matching criteria that may impact 
the likelihood of CEO turnover. For example, Table 1 indicates that, although the 
overall performance was similar between the two samples, turnover firms ex-
perience a greater number of large earnings declines during the eight quarters 
prior to turnover. It is reasonable to expect the WSJ to report more frequently on 
large earnings declines. Therefore, the greater reporting on the performance of 
the turnover firms may be due to large declines in earnings. Further, it is possible 
that the additional WSJ coverage of forced-turnover firms may be symptomatic 
of operating problems at these firms rather than contributing to the likelihood of 
CEO turnover.
To control for these possibilities and more formally examine the relation be-
tween WSJ coverage and forced CEO turnover, we estimate a logit model with 
a dependent variable equal to one for the forced-turnover firms and zero for 
the matching firms. A potential concern associated with this type of analysis 
is the unequal sampling rates from firms that force CEO turnover and those 
that do not. Maddala (1991) points out, however, that “the coefficients of the ex-
planatory variables are not affected by the unequal sampling rates from the two 
groups. It is only the constant term that is affected.” According to Maddala, the 
same cannot be said of the probit model. The purpose of this analysis is not to 
develop a model for predicting CEO turnover, but to determine the causes of 
turnover, so it is appropriate to use a choice-based sample and estimate a logit 
model.
We estimate several versions of the logit model. In all of the versions, we con-
trol for firm size (using the natural log of sales), outside board membership (us-
ing the percent of the board of directors that consists of independent outside di-
rectors), and inside ownership (using the percent of firm equity owned by the 
officers of the firm).20 The results of the logit regressions are shown in Table 6.
The first version of the logit model, Model 1, includes the number of quarters 
with greater than a 50% decline in earnings as an explanatory variable. We in-
clude this variable in the analysis for two reasons. First, Table 1 shows differences 
in this variable between the turnover and matched samples. Second, our primary 
interest is in how WSJ reporting on poor firm performance affects the likelihood 
of CEO turnover and we include a measure of firm performance to control for 
the correlation between WSJ reporting on firm performance and the level of firm 
performance. The measure of firm performance we have chosen should be more 
closely related to WSJ reporting than other measures.21 Not surprisingly, the co-
efficient on this performance measure is positive and statistically significant, sug-
20 We considered several other potential control variables, including CEO age, institutional 
ownership, board size, and other measures of firm size. None of these variables were signifi-
cant in any of our regressions and did not have any notable impact on other coefficients.
21 This measure of firm performance is more highly correlated with the number of WSJ news 
items about poor firm performance than the other measures of performance shown in Table 
1. However, the correlation coefficient is only 0.20 with a P-value of 0.012.
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gesting that those firms with the greatest number of large declines in earnings are 
more likely to experience forced CEO turnover.
It is surprising that none of our control variables are significant in any of the 
models shown in Table 6. Inside ownership has the expected sign, but is not sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels. The lack of significance for the natu-
ral log of sales and outside board membership may be explained, in part, by the 
matching criteria. Firm size was one of the matching criteria and outside board 
membership tends to vary more between industries than within industries. Given 
that our matching firms are drawn from the same industry as the turnover firms, 
it is not unusual that the board composition of the turnover firms and matched 
firms are similar.
In Model 2 we exclude the performance measure from Model 1 and include 
the number of WSJ news items about a decline in earnings. Model 3 includes both 
variables. The coefficient on the number of WSJ news items about a decline in 
earnings is positive and statistically significant even after controlling for the level 
of firm performance. This suggests that while poor firm performance increases 
the likelihood of CEO turnover, the likelihood of CEO turnover is even greater 
when the WSJ is reporting on the firm’s performance, consistent with the pair-
wise comparisons made in Tables 4 and 5.22
Models 4–6 assess whether the observed relation between the number of WSJ 
news items about a decline in earnings and forced CEO turnover is spurious. It 
is possible that the additional coverage of forced-turnover firms is symptomatic 
of operating problems at these firms rather than contributing to the likelihood 
of CEO turnover. Table 4 indicates that the turnover firms made more “bad” de-
cisions, which is due primarily to the greater number of asset sales, layoffs, and 
downsizing decisions. We include the number of these two types of decisions in 
Models 4 and 5 to assess whether these decisions, which are indicative of operat-
ing problems, increase the likelihood of CEO turnover. Included in Model 6 is the 
number of negative CAR decisions announced in the WSJ.
The results shown in Table 6 indicate that, after controlling for firm perfor-
mance and the number of WSJ news items about a decline in earnings, the man-
ager-decision variables do not have a statistically significant impact on the likeli-
hood of CEO turnover. Further, the coefficient on the number of WSJ news items 
about a decline in earnings is still statistically significant.23 These results are con-
sistent with Khanna and Poulsen (1995) and suggest that the CEOs in our sample 
were fired for reasons other than the decisions they made.24 In sum, the results 
22 We estimated several versions of Table 6 to investigate the sensitivity of our results to the 
choice of the 50% decline in earnings threshold and potential seasonality in this measure. 
In all cases, the results with respect to the “number of news items about a decline in earn-
ings” variable are qualitatively unchanged. The results of this sensitivity analysis are avail-
able from the authors.
23 It should be noted that we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the “number of WSJ 
stories about a decline in earnings” variable is somehow capturing differences in firm per-
formance or operating problems despite our efforts to control for these differences.
24 When we exclude “the number of WSJ news items about a decline in earnings” from Mod-
els 4–7, the coefficients on the other WSJ news item variables are still not statistically 
significant.
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shown in Models 4–6 of Table 6 suggest that WSJ reporting on poor firm per-
formance increases the likelihood of CEO turnover even after controlling for the 
level of performance and other indicators of operating problems at the firm.
Table 6. Logit regression resultsa
Explanatory variables                     Dependent variable: Forced CEO turnover 
(measured prior to turnover)
                                                     Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 4     Model 5    Model 6    Model 7
Constant 0.182 1.268 0.703 0.974 1.011 0.863 0.793
 (0.155) (1.074) (0.575) (0.779) (0.804) (0.684) (0.644)
Natural log of sales –0.019 –0.139 –0.103 –0.143 –0.146 –0.131 –0.120
 (–0.144) (–1.041) (–0.752) (–1.001) (–1.019) (–0.885) (–0.860)
Outside board membership –0.950 –0.812 –1.146 –1.243 –1.255 –1.183 –1.162
 (–0.914) (–0.792) (–1.082) (–1.168) (1.178) (–1.114) (–1.095)
Inside ownership –5.053 –5.555 –5.082 –5.138 –5.092 –5.169 –5.242
 (–1.364) (–1.534) (–1.337) (–1.360) (–1.348) (–1.364) (–1.358)
Number of quarters with greater  0.414***  0.366*** 0.345** 0.345** 0.363*** 
0.367***
than a 50% decline in earnings (3.065)  (2.672) (2.477) (2.479) (2.640) (2.677)
Number of WSJ news items  0.339*** 0.267** 0.227* 0.228* 0.251* 0.245*
about a decline in earnings  (2.582) (2.002) (1.647) (1.656) (1.838) (1.792)
Number of “bad” decisions    0.090
announced in the WSJ    (1.008)
Number of asset sales, layoffs, and     0.091
downsizings announced in the WSJ     (1.000)
Number of negative CAR      0.048
decisions announced in the WSJ      (0.498)
 
Number of legal actions against        0.127
the firm announced in the WSJ       (0.703)
Number of observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
Chi-square 12.4** 10.2* 16.7*** 17.8*** 17.8*** 17.0*** 17.2***
a Logit regression results (and t-statistics) of the likelihood of forced CEO turnover for a sample of 79 firms that 
forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of 79 firms that did not force CEO turnover. The natural log of 
sales is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to turnover. Outside board membership is the percentage 
of the board of directors that is comprised of independent outsiders. Inside ownership is the percentage of 
equity owned by the officers of the firm. Both of these variables are taken from the last proxy statement filed 
before CEO turnover. The number of quarters with greater than a 50% decline in earnings and the number 
of WSJ news items are measured during the two years prior to CEO turnover. One of the turnover firms 
and one of the matched firms have missing data for the decline in earnings variable and are not included in 
the analysis.
*      Parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level.
**    Parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level
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Table 5 indicates that there were more stories about the turnover firms being 
the target of legal actions. To determine whether this is affecting the likelihood of 
CEO turnover, we include the number of WSJ news items about the firm being 
Table 7. Logit regression results with alternative performance measures
Explanatory variables                 Dependent variable: Forced CEO turnover 
(measured prior to turnover)
                                                Model 3A      Model 3B       Model 3C       Model 3D    Model 3E
Constant  1.278  1.431  0.721  1.149  1.106
 (1.077)  (1.153)  (0.469)  (0.914)  (0.877)
Natural log of sales  –0.131  –0.166  –0.093  –0.126  –0.134
 (–0.970)  (–1.178)  (–0.512)  (–0.893)  (–0.993)
Outside board membership  –0.902  –0.659  –0.067  –0.806  –0.851
 (–0.871)  (–0.609)  (–0.043)  (–0.786)  (–0.831)
Inside ownership  –5.414  –7.203*  –8.177  –5.534  –5.168
 (–1.488)  (–1.692)  (–1.376)  (–1.524)  (–1.402)
Number of WSJ news items 0.338***  0.314**  0.222  0.331**  0.325**
  about a decline in earnings (2.584)  (2.373)  (1.322)  (2.481)  (2.477)
Industry-adjusted ROAAa  –0.015
 (–0.674)
Change in industry-adjusted  0.022
  ROAAa  (0.505)
Average quarterly earnings   –0.051
  surpriseb   (–0.161)
Average annual market-adjusted    –0.227
  stock returnsc    (–0.275)
Number of quarters with a     0.035
  decline in earningsd     (0.231)
Number of observations  158  144  76  158  156
Chi-square  10.7*  10.4*  4.7  10.3*  9.2
a Pre-turnover return on average assets (ROAA) is measured during the last two years ending prior 
to CEO turnover. It is industry adjusted by Differencing from industry medians. Industries are 
based on two-digit SIC codes. Changes in ROAA are based on changes in the industry-adjusted 
performance measures during the two years prior to CEO turnover. Calculating the changes 
requires three years of pre-turnover data, which was not available for some of the firms.
b Earnings surprise data are the percentage Difference between actual quarterly earnings and 
forecasted earnings. Forecasted earnings are from Zachs Investment Research. Quarterly earnings 
forecasts were available for only 38 matched pairs.
c Stock returns are market-adjusted using the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted index.
d The number of quarters with a decline in earnings is measured during the eight quarters that end 
prior to CEO turnover. One of the turnover firms and one of the matched firms have missing 
data for the decline in earnings variable and are not included in the analysis.
*  Parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level.
**  Parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level.
***  Parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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the target of legal action in Model 7 of Table 6. The results indicate that this vari-
able is not statistically significant in explaining CEO turnover. This is consistent 
with Agrawal et al. (1999) who find little evidence that the managers of firms that 
are charged with fraud have an increased likelihood of losing their jobs. A more 
detailed analysis based on a breakdown of the different types of legal actions (al-
leged fraud; shareholder class-action lawsuits; copyright, patent, trademark or li-
censing infringement; antitrust lawsuits; environmental lawsuits; wrongful termi-
nation lawsuits; and other legal actions) fails to yield more meaningful results.25
4.6. Logit analysis of CEO turnover using alternative performance measures
The results shown in Table 6 suggest a strong relation between WSJ reporting 
on poor firm performance and the likelihood of CEO turnover, even after con-
trolling for the level of firm performance. Given the possibility that WSJ report-
ing on firm performance might be capturing the impact of firm performance on 
CEO turnover and not the impact of scrutiny by the financial press, we investi-
gate how other performance measures affect the logit results.
The results of estimating Model 3 using alternative performance measures are 
reported in Table 7. Surprisingly, none of our other performance measures were 
statistically significant. This is probably due to the matching criteria we used. Our 
matching firms had similar stock price performance during the two years prior to 
turnover, so it is not surprising that this and other performance measures were 
not statistically significant in explaining forced CEO turnover. In all but one ver-
sion of Model 3 is the number of WSJ news items about a decline in earnings sta-
tistically significant. The exception is the model that includes the average quar-
terly earnings surprise as an explanatory variable. The lack of significance may be 
due to insufficient data, however, as we were only able to estimate this version of 
the model for 76 firms (38 turnover firms and their matching firms).
5. Conclusion
We examine differences in WSJ news articles for a sample of firms that forced 
CEO turnover and a sample of matching firms that did not force turnover. We 
find that the firms that force CEO turnover are the subjects of a greater frequency 
of news announcements, especially news articles about declining earnings, rela-
tive to their matched sample counterparts for the two years prior to the turnover. 
Despite this increased scrutiny of the forced-turnover sample firms, the mar-
ket’s response to the decisions announced by the forced-turnover sample firms 
were similar to those announced by the matched-sample firms. This finding sug-
gests that senior managers of the forced-turnover sample did not make inferior 
or relatively unanticipated decisions but that increased scrutiny of the firm’s per-
formance pressured the board of directors to make changes in the firm’s senior 
management.
25 These results are available from the authors.
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The increased scrutiny of the forced-turnover sample firms continues post-
turnover as evidenced by a continued greater frequency of news announcements 
relative to the matched-sample firms. However, the frequency of news announce-
ments about increased earnings is significantly greater after turnover for the 
forced-turnover sample firms than the comparable set of announcements for the 
matched-sample firms.
The results are consistent with several arguments about how the financial 
press can influence corporate governance. First, to the extent that financial press 
coverage influences the investing public’s assessment of a firm’s value, the board 
of directors may respond to negative coverage by forcing CEO turnover in an ef-
fort to avoid a further decline in firm value. Second, if financial press coverage of 
poor firm performance exacerbates operating problems by harming relations with 
suppliers, customers, and lenders, the board may remove the CEO in an effort to 
improve these relations. Third, if directors perceive media coverage of poor firm 
performance as damaging their reputations as experts in decision control, they 
may respond by forcing CEO turnover in an effort to salvage their reputations. 
Finally, the board of directors may force CEO turnover if they view the CEO as 
ineffective in managing the media’s coverage of the firm.
Regardless of which of these non-mutually exclusive arguments explains the 
results, it appears that reporting by the financial press improves corporate gover-
nance. This important result suggests that the financial press (along with activist 
institutional investors, outside blockholders, and takeover markets) helps to miti-
gate the free rider problem associated with diffusely owned corporations.
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